French residents, their political party preferences and attitudes towards key Ukraine policies

In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion into Ukraine, profoundly altering EU policies and politics. The European Union and its member states have strongly supported Ukraine in its defence.

Since the last presidential and parliamentary elections in France, governing the country has become increasingly challenging. While French voters granted President Macron a second term in the Élysée Palace, they denied his party, Renaissance, a majority in the Assemblée Nationale. French presidents typically have limited involvement in daily politics but wield significant power in foreign and defence policies. However, given the current state of domestic affairs, President Macron must act cautiously, as his most vocal opponents are critical of support for Ukraine.

Against the backdrop of the upcoming European parliamentary elections, this report focuses on the correlation in France between individuals’ political party preferences and their stance on seven key Ukraine-related policy issues:

1. Does the European Union need a common defence policy?

2. Should the EU support Ukraine by delivering weapons?

3. Should your country accept refugees from Ukraine?

4. Should the EU accept Ukraine as a member state in the coming years?

5. Should the EU become more energy independent of Russia even if that means prices are rising even further?

6. Do you think economic and financial sanctions on Russia are effective or ineffective?

7. Do you think the reconstruction of Ukraine will be an economic opportunity or an economic burden for the EU?

For each question, we provide an overview of the general distribution in France, followed by a breakdown according to political party preferences. These findings stem from a survey conducted in December 2023, encompassing nearly 13,000 EU citizens. Our dataset is representative of the EU as a whole and, more specifically, of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. In France, we interviewed 1,419 citizens.

Please note

This report “France, the War and the Vote” is part of an eight-part series.

Part 1

explores the relationship between political orientation and support for Ukraine-related policies across the EU and in seven member states.

Parts 2-8

Part 1 is complemented by seven country reports, each examining the correlation between political party preferences and the same set of Ukraine-related questions:

An overview:

1. Which political party – if any – do you feel close to?
General distribution (GD) in France

2. Does the European Union need a common defence policy?
GD in France and by political party preferences

3. Should the EU support Ukraine by delivering weapons?
GD in France and by political party preferences

4. Should your country accept refugees from Ukraine?
GD in France and by political party preferences

5. Should the EU accept Ukraine as a member state in the coming years?
GD in France and by political party preferences

6. Should the EU become more energy independent of Russia even if that means prices are rising even further?
GD in France and by political party preferences

7. Do you think economic and financial sanctions on Russia are effective or ineffective?
GD in France and by political party preferences

8. Do you think the reconstruction of Ukraine will be an economic opportunity or an economic burden for the EU?
GD in France and by political party preferences

Conclusions

As EU citizens prepare for the upcoming European Parliament elections in June, closely followed by the nomination of a new European Commission, our aim in this country report was to assess public sentiment and explore more deeply how Ukraine-related policies intersect with party preferences in France.

In summary, our findings are as follows:

  • Support for Ukraine policies is strongest among those on the centre-left. 
  • Support tends to be higher in the political centre than on either end of the political spectrum.
  • Overall, support is strongest among those aligned with the Renaissance (RE) party.
  • Overall, support is weakest among those aligned with the Rassemblement National (RN).
  • In France, most people do not align closely with any political party. 29% of French respondents do not affiliate with any party, a percentage greater than that of any individual party group. These individuals are generally supportive of Ukraine policies. They are more optimistic than others regarding the reconstruction of Ukraine, with 41% viewing it as an opportunity. However, they are notably pessimistic about sanctions against Russia, with 60% considering them ineffective.
  • The relevance of those not affiliated with any party distinguishes France from any other EU member state analysed.

An analysis of each graph shows the following patterns:

  • European Defence Policy: Support for the concept of a common European defence policy is robust across all subgroups. Supporters of RE, EELV, LR, MoDem, PCF, and PS all endorse it by 87% at least. Those aligned with the RN and FI show relatively weaker support at 76%. While there is vast support for the concept, individuals across different political affiliations may disagree on the specifics of what a common defence policy should entail.
  • Weapons Delivery: Support for weapons delivery is strongest among those aligned with the RE (91%), MoDem and EELV (both 73%) parties. It is weakest among FI (49%) and RN (52%) adherents.
  • Refugee Acceptance: Support for accepting Ukrainian refugees is strongest among those aligned with the RE (91%) and EELV (82%). It is weakest among RN adherents (47%).
  • EU Membership for Ukraine: Overall, support for Ukraine’s EU membership has seen a downturn in recent months. The strongest support for Ukraine’s EU membership comes from those who prefer the RE party (83%). It is weakest among those without a party affiliation (53%) and those aligned with the RN (43%). Support among all other groups hovers around 60%.
  • Energy Independence: Among parties with a larger base, RE and Horizons adherents (both 86%) show the strongest support for energy independence from Russia, followed by those aligned with EELV (73%) and PS (70%). Support is weakest among those who prefer the RN (59%) and FI (52%).
  • Effectiveness of Sanctions: A majority of French believe that economic and financial sanctions imposed on Russia are ineffective (63%). When examining preferences within the most popular parties, this belief is strongest among RN (74%) and FI (69%) supporters, while RE supporters are most optimistic, with only 46% considering the sanctions ineffective.
  • Reconstruction of Ukraine: A majority of French believe that the reconstruction of Ukraine will pose an economic burden, a finding also reflected across all subgroups. Exceptions to this sentiment are supporters of RE and EELV, with 58% and 52%, respectively, seeing more opportunity than burden. Conversely, supporters of RN and FI are more sceptical, viewing it primarily as a burden (75% and 64%, respectively).  

About eupinions

eupinions is an independent platform for European public opinion. We collect and analyse data on European public opinion and comment on what Europeans think about current political issues and megatrends.​

Every quarter, we collect samples from each EU member state in 22 languages. ​Our data is representative with regard to age, gender, education and country/region.​

eupinions is a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. The data is collected by Latana.​

Visit www.eupinions.eu for further information!

Methodology note

The samples analysed in this report were drawn by Latana in December 2023 (n=13,299) across all 27 EU member states. Our samples take into account current population distributions with regard to age (16-70 years), gender and region/country. In order to obtain census representative results, the data were weighted using the most recent Eurostat statistics.

Any references to differences between countries in the report pertain only to the seven countries with sufficiently large sample sizes: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.

Given the sample size and design-effect considerations, the margin of error is 0.9% at a confidence level of 95%.