Executive Summary

Fighting for their sovereignty in the full-scale war Russia has been waging openly against Ukraine since February 2022, Ukrainians see themselves as defending both their country and Europe’s security and freedom. However, this sense of a shared struggle for a European way of life and European values in the face of Russia’s war of aggression is not matched by support among EU citizens for Ukraine to join the Union in the near future.

A new representative survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, conducted in the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, compares responses from across the EU and selected member states with those from the non-occupied territories of Ukraine. The aim is to shed light on Ukrainians’ and EU residents’ understandings and expectations regarding Ukraine’s deeper integration into the EU and, ultimately, its accession. 

The survey results indicate that most EU respondents do not want Ukraine to join the Union soon. In addition, whereas Ukrainians are willing to accept short-term costs to enable Ukraine’s EU membership, most EU residents are not. Crucially, there are divergent understandings of exactly who is protecting whom from Russia’s imperial aggression. 

These differences in perspective underline the need for greater mutual understanding. The common narrative that EU enlargement is a geopolitical necessity and that the EU needs to have Ukraine as a member state to ensure the EU’s own security and autonomy has not been resonating with EU residents. Rather than merely letting Ukraine continue along a protracted and slow path towards EU membership, policymakers should use strategic communication and a more focused public debate to address misconceptions. Bridging the gap between Ukrainians’ and EU residents’ expectations and anxieties would help mitigate disappointment and lay more solid foundations for an enlargement that would genuinely strengthen the Union. 

Introduction

Among the European countries hoping to join the EU, Ukraine is a special case. Stripped of their illusions about Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many Europeans welcomed Kyiv’s application. Some even called for an accelerated accession. Yet solidarity with Ukraine gradually faded. By December 2025, when a proposal emerged to include 1 January 2027 as Ukraine’s accession date in a so-called peace plan initiated by the United States, levels of public support for Ukraine’s EU accession among EU residents had already fallen.

From a Ukrainian perspective, an early date for accession could help offset the concessions that a ceasefire is likely to require – first and foremost, de facto acceptance of territorial losses. However, a firm commitment to admit Ukraine on a predetermined date would bear little resemblance to the EU’s established accession process. It would sideline the principle of merit-based accession, under which reforms are undertaken before a country joins the Union – thereby sending mixed signals to the EU’s other candidate countries.

To Russia, Ukraine’s accession would only send a signal of strength if it were underpinned by credible security guarantees. Those are in Europe’s interest regardless of Ukraine’s formal accession, and EU member states contribute to them to varying degrees through NATO and bilaterally. Doubts about the reliability of the transatlantic partnership have created a sense of urgency – both to secure a ceasefire and to prepare Europe for a future when it can defend itself without relying on Washington. As a member state, Ukraine would also be formally covered by the EU’s mutual assistance clause. But this has become a two-way street, as Ukraine’s military capabilities are important to the emerging European security order, especially given that Ukraine has Europe’s only army with large-scale modern combat experience.

Beyond its military capabilities and technological innovations, Ukraine would bring strategic added value to the EU in energy, critical raw materials, agriculture and food security. Nevertheless, the European Commission cannot prevail over the member states, and even after Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat, other governments will not abandon their preconditions. Even supporters of Ukraine’s accession envisage time for adjustments, and a pared-down accession process that dispenses with key elements would also call into question the EU’s character as a community based on the rule of law. 

For Ukrainian society, alongside the need to secure a truce, the prospect of EU membership is vital in three respects. Socially, it offers a vision of a future worth holding out for even after years of war. Politically and economically, the goal of EU membership gives a sense of direction amid the toxic combination of domestic political tensions, economic hardship, the gradual depletion of Ukraine’s labour force, and new Russian threats looming in what has become a race of ever-faster military and technological innovation. 

EU integration and security cooperation work best in tandem. Security arrangements between the EU and Ukraine that provide credible defence and deterrence are also a prerequisite for improving Ukraine’s weak record when it comes to attracting foreign direct investment. All of this will require openly addressing the anxieties of EU voters rather than waiting for them to eventually accept Ukraine’s accession. 

To better understand and address the different expectations and concerns of both EU citizens and Ukrainians, the Bertelsmann Stiftung asked several questions about Ukraine’s potential EU membership in a representative survey of 18,948 individuals, including 16,795 in the EU and 2,153 in the government-controlled parts of Ukraine. Collected by Nira Data in June 2026, the data are representative of the populations of the EU, Ukraine and the selected EU member states included in the analysis.

One of the survey’s key findings is that public opinion in the EU and Ukraine diverges in several ways – most notably on the question of Ukraine’s potential EU membership.

Figure 1

As Figure 1 shows, a majority (53%) of people living in the EU do not want Ukraine to become part of the EU in the coming years. In contrast, five out of six Ukrainians (83%) want their country to become an EU member soon.  

In looking at the selected EU member states, one notices low support for Ukraine’s accession in Romania, Germany and Poland but high support elsewhere, particularly in Sweden. The low level of support in Romania and Poland may be surprising, as both countries share a border with Ukraine and have direct security interests related to the outcome of the ongoing war and Ukraine’s stability more broadly. This might lead one to expect them to want Ukraine to be represented in the EU. 

However, Poland – where representative data collection in the first months following the full-scale invasion showed citizens predominantly in favour of Ukraine’s accession (cf. Figure 9 below) – is a case in point of how historical differences can overshadow current security interests, especially if instrumentalised in political disputes (take, for example, the divergent historical memories of the role played by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the Second World War). Concerns about increased economic competition from Ukraine may also shape attitudes in Poland. In contrast, almost seven out of 10 people (69%) in Sweden look favourably upon Ukraine’s EU accession in the coming years, making the Swedes the strongest advocates of an EU enlargement including Ukraine. This support is potentially due to a high level of public awareness of security and resilience issues as well as optimism about the prospect of easier economic cooperation and lower transaction costs following Ukraine’s accession.

Why are the residents of some EU member states more sceptical of Ukraine’s potential EU accession than those in other member states? One reason concerns the main benefits and challenges that respondents anticipate if Ukraine were to join the EU as a full member.

Figure 2

When looking at the responses to the question about the main benefit of Ukraine’s accession for the EU (Figure 2), one notices a few (but not too many) differences between countries. Across the EU, in almost all selected member states and in Ukraine, the benefit cited most often is that Ukraine’s EU membership would provide more security for Ukraine. This benefit was cited particularly often in Sweden (38%). In contrast, more than a quarter of all respondents in Romania and Poland (30% and 26%, respectively) emphasise a lower risk of war through deterrence. 

These findings suggest that respondents view both deterrence and Ukraine’s security as integral to the security of Europe as a whole. In contrast, other potential benefits – such as that the EU would become stronger and more influential with Ukraine as a full member – are mentioned by fewer than 20% of respondents in each surveyed country. This is important because, at present, EU communication efforts overwhelmingly frame enlargement as an investment in greater strength and power. Although the argument that admitting Ukraine would make the EU stronger is valid, it does not by itself seem to persuade the EU public.

Figure 3

When looking at the main challenge of Ukraine’s potential EU membership (Figure 3), more pronounced differences emerge between respondents in the EU and Ukraine. Those in the EU primarily think of financial burdens and security risks for the EU as the main challenges (28% and 27% agreement levels, respectively). Concern about financial burdens is particularly widespread in Germany (36%) and also acknowledged by a quarter (25%) of Ukrainian respondents. A third (33%) of the latter believe that some EU countries would have less influence if Ukraine were to join the EU, yet it is interesting to note that this potential challenge receives comparatively little attention within the member states themselves (11% on average). Meanwhile, only a small share of Ukrainian respondents believe that Ukraine’s EU membership could increase security risks for the Union (also 11%).

Figure 4

Among the individual member states, Poland and Romania stand out once again – along with Spain – as being the most sceptical about Ukraine’s contribution to protecting the EU from Russian aggression (Figure 4). Almost 40% of respondents in these three countries view the EU and the member states as contributing more than Ukraine to protecting the Union from Russia, while only a little more than 10% see Ukraine as the larger contributor of security. Especially for Ukrainian civilians standing up against Russian efforts to make daily life unbearable, these results from member states will be a bitter pill to swallow. Remarkably, almost a third of all EU respondents (32%) believe that neither the EU nor Ukraine contributes anything to the protection of the Union. This perception is particularly pronounced in Italy and France (40% and 39%, respectively).

The perspectives of EU citizens and Ukrainians also diverge when they have to predict whether it would create more economic opportunities or challenges for their country if Ukraine were to join the EU (Figure 5). 

Figure 5

While 64% of respondents in the EU said it would result in more challenges, 74% of Ukrainian respondents believe it would create more opportunities. Respondents in France, Germany and Poland were especially worried about economic challenges (69% and 68%, respectively), followed by Romania (66%). Dutch respondents were comparatively less sceptical (with 56% seeing more challenges) even though agriculture is a large part of the country’s economy and the Netherlands would likely face new competition if Ukraine were to join the EU. The least sceptical country is once again Sweden, where half of respondents expect more challenges and half more opportunities. This may partly reflect the emphasis that Swedish business associations place on the economic opportunities that could arise from enlargement, including the anticipated positive impact of Ukraine’s accession on the GDP of the EU-27.

Seeing potential challenges is not problematic if one is ready to accept the costs that often come with addressing them. However, whereas Ukrainians are willing to bear short-term costs if it will help their country to achieve EU membership, most EU residents are not (Figure 6). 

Figure 6

Almost two-thirds (62%) of respondents in the EU do not want to accept short-term economic costs in exchange for letting Ukraine join the Union. The opposite picture emerges in Ukraine itself, where two-thirds (67%) of respondents are willing to do so. 

Once again, the findings reveal a stark contrast: whereas Ukrainians are facing the inevitable challenges associated with EU accession with optimism and confidence, apprehension prevails in most EU member states. This finding may, of course, also reflect limited awareness in Ukraine about the typical adjustment costs involving investments and human resources, such as for companies to comply with EU standards or for government agencies to put new regulations in place, as well as regarding the implications of transferring some sovereign powers to the EU level.

Looking at particular EU member states, respondents in Sweden are almost as willing as those in Ukraine (65% and 67%, respectively) to bear short-term economic costs. However, in all other selected member states, a majority of respondents are unwilling to accept those potential costs. The population in Romania is particularly sceptical in this regard, with only 26% of respondents willing to bear economic costs for the sake of Ukraine’s EU accession.

Survey respondents in the EU and Ukraine differ not only in their views on the merits of Ukraine’s potential EU accession but also on the preconditions Ukraine should meet and the process it should follow to join the Union.

Figure 7

Figure 7 shows what respondents believe are the most important factors for Ukraine’s EU membership to succeed. Respondents could choose multiple answers. In the EU, more than a third (37%) perceive a peace agreement with Russia as one such vital factor. In Ukraine, only 18% of the respondents share this assessment. Instead, Ukrainians emphasise the importance of reforms in their country (50%) and of beneficial ties between Ukraine and the EU (41%). By contrast, these factors are cited less often by EU respondents (26% and 22%, respectively). 

These findings suggest that Ukrainians may have a more sober assessment of why Russia is waging this war as well as how long it intends to and is able to sustain it. EU residents may either genuinely regard peace with Russia as a prerequisite or may invoke the war as a justification to defer Ukraine’s EU accession. Ukrainians, on the other hand, are well aware of two facts: first, that the Kremlin will not be satisfied with territorial gains alone and, second, that the Russian leadership’s main interest in fighting this war is to prevent Ukraine from becoming a liberal democracy – and, by extension, from joining the EU. Indeed, the Kremlin sees in Ukraine a dangerous example to its own dissatisfied citizens and therefore a threat to its authoritarian power structure. In addition, as might be expected, the findings highlight strong public support for reform in Ukraine.

Debates on Ukraine’s prospective EU accession have also featured alternative enlargement models. A step-by-step approach has been defined as giving Ukraine partial access to EU institutions, policies and funding while stopping short of granting full voting rights and membership.

Figure 8

When asked about this concept (Figure 8), most respondents in the EU (56%) prefer this option, either as an interim step towards full membership or even as a permanent alternative to it. By contrast, a majority of Ukrainian respondents (52%) reject this model, with 43% favouring a direct path to full EU membership without such an intermediate arrangement. 

Substantial differences also emerge among the selected EU member states. A step-by-step approach as an interim solution is particularly popular in Portugal (45%) and the Netherlands (41%), whereas roughly a third of Swedes (34%) prefer a step-by-step approach as a permanent alternative to full membership. This may reflect either reservations about full membership among Swedes, who otherwise strongly support Ukraine and its EU ambitions, or their pragmatic willingness to support Ukraine’s closer integration regardless of its formal institutional status. Opposition to any further integration is particularly widespread in Romania and Poland (40% and 36%, respectively), which is remarkable given the fact that these countries are Ukraine’s neighbours. Poland is particularly noteworthy, as public attitudes towards Ukraine and Ukrainians have become less positive since the initial wave of solidarity in 2022 (cf. eupinions Ukraine trends, referenced partly in this publication’s Figure 9). Domestic political competition ahead of Poland’s parliamentary elections, which are scheduled to be held in 2027, may be reinforcing this shift.

At this point, one may pause and wonder: have such divergent perspectives between the EU and Ukraine always been there? Didn’t most Europeans admire the courage, confidence and resilience of Ukrainians just a few years ago? 

Figure 9
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eupinions Ukraine trends / EU membership Ukraine

Should the EU accept Ukraine as a member of the EU in the coming years?

Yes, the EU should accept Ukraine as a member of the EU in the coming years.

Please note: As representative data collection in Romania and Sweden did not begin until June 2026, neither country is included in this line chart. For Portugal, representative data have only been available since December 2024.

As the Bertelsmann Stiftung has been asking EU residents about Ukraine’s potential EU accession several times a year since March 2022, one can look at the answers over time and notice a clear downward trend (Figure 9). In March 2022, two-thirds (69%) of EU residents agreed that Ukraine should become an EU member in the coming years. In the meantime, support has gradually fallen to less than half (47%). This downward trend is visible for all selected EU member states, but particularly for Poland (from 87% in March 2022 to 43% in June 2026). After an initial wave of solidarity with Ukraine, EU respondents have become increasingly sceptical about having Ukraine join the Union.

Figure 10
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eupinions Ukraine trends / EU enlargement

Should the EU accept new member states in the coming years?

Yes, the EU should accept new member states in the coming years.

Please note: As representative data collection in Romania and Sweden did not begin until June 2026, neither country is included in this line chart. For Portugal, representative data have only been available since December 2024.

The increasing level of scepticism regarding Ukraine’s EU accession has been accompanied by a general reluctance to accept any new EU members in the coming years (Figure 10). While 73% of EU citizens were willing to accept new members into the Union in March 2022, that figure had dropped to 48% by June 2026. Again, this downward trend is observable for all selected EU member states. While respondents in some countries are generally more positive about having new EU members (e.g. the Spanish, down to 61% from 85%), others are more negative (e.g. the French, down to 34% from 64%). Nevertheless, support for admitting new members has declined across the board. In fact, EU respondents have become just as unwilling to accept Ukraine as a new EU member in the coming years as they are unwilling to accept new member states in general.

Zooming in on how EU enlargement was generally viewed by EU residents and Ukrainians in June 2026 (Figure 11), one can see a divergence similar to the one regarding attitudes towards Ukraine’s potential EU accession (Figure 1).

Figure 11

A majority of respondents in the EU (52%) do not believe that the EU should accept any new member states in the coming years, while five out of six respondents in Ukraine (83%) have the opposite view. These results almost perfectly mirror the attitudes on Ukraine’s potential EU accession: while 53% of Europeans disagree that Ukraine should become a member of the EU in the coming years, 83% of Ukrainians agree that it should (Figure 1).

In the selected EU member states, however, views on enlargement in general differ considerably from views on Ukraine’s potential accession. Respondents in France are the least likely to advocate for any EU enlargement in the coming years (34% agreement), while those in Spain are the most likely to do so (61%). Surprisingly, a majority of respondents in Romania (60%) and Poland (53%) also support EU enlargement. This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that more Poles and Romanians support EU enlargement in general than support admitting their neighbour Ukraine as a new member. Interestingly, the EU’s founding member states are particularly sceptical about enlargement in general.

The following two sets of findings look beyond national-level patterns and examine differences in the EU (Figure 12) and Ukraine (Figure 13) by age, educational attainment and place of residence.

Figure 12

In comparing the attitudes of the different age groups in the EU, it is actually the oldest respondents rather than the youngest ones who are most enthusiastic about EU enlargement (Figure 12). A majority (54%) of 56- to 69-year-olds say that the EU should accept new member states in the coming years, while younger respondents predominantly disagree with this perspective. 

The comparison of demographic groups also shows that more educated respondents are more likely to prefer EU enlargement in the coming years than those with a lower educational attainment level. Similarly, EU residents living in more urban areas view enlargement more favourably than those living in rural areas.   

Figure 13

Although respondents in Ukraine are overwhelmingly in favour of EU enlargement in the coming years (Figure 13), there are still some differences among demographic groups. Again, it is not the youngest respondents who are the most enthusiastic – in fact, the youngest Ukrainians are the ones least in favour of it, with an agreement level of “only” 74%. Support is about 10 percentage points higher in all other age groups. Furthermore, higher educational attainment and living in a city are associated with greater support for enlargement, mirroring the pattern among EU residents. Nevertheless, a stark contrast remains in how positively Ukrainians and how negatively EU residents look at the prospect of any EU enlargement in the coming years.

Just as EU residents and Ukrainians have divergent views on EU enlargement – on its benefits and challenges, on who is providing security for whom, and on the particular path to accession – they also differ in terms of how they see the future of EU-Ukraine relations.

Figure 14

When asked about their top priorities in the coming years (Figure 14), respondents in Ukraine identify more priorities while those in the EU tend to name fewer. 

For both EU residents and Ukrainians, recovery and reconstruction in Ukraine is the priority cited most often (35% and 53%, respectively), followed by stronger security cooperation (29% and 45%, respectively). Ukrainians also emphasise the importance of financial support for their country (38%), which EU citizens do not view as being very important (13%). Almost a third of respondents in the EU (29%) would not prioritise any of the five given topics in EU-Ukraine relations. In other words, there are few issues to be discussed from the perspective of EU citizens but several from the perspective of Ukrainians.

In the selected EU member states, Swedish respondents are by far the most supportive of prioritising recovery and reconstruction in Ukraine (56%), stronger security cooperation (44%) and financial support for Ukraine (25%). Respondents in Portugal, on the other hand, are the most supportive of prioritising more business, investment and trade (28%) as well as Ukraine’s path to EU membership (30%). Among Romanians, roughly two-fifths (42%) of respondents believe that none of those five topics should be a priority in EU-Ukraine relations.

As with the findings on security, the results from EU member states on priorities for relations are likely to be difficult for Ukrainians to accept given Russia’s efforts to cripple Ukraine’s economy and thereby inflict further hardship on civilians.

Concluding remarks

The divergent perspectives among EU residents and Ukrainians make one thing clear: Ukraine’s path to EU accession will also need to become a “marathon of persuasion” to build up and sustain public support. The survey results reveal that the disagreements between those who already are and those who wish to become EU citizens are neither minor nor straightforward. Instead, there are several serious divergences between survey respondents in the EU and Ukraine – not only about EU enlargement but also about contributions to (and credit for) Europe’s defence and security. What’s more, these differences of opinion have only become more pronounced over time and will not vanish overnight.  

Overcoming these differences will take greater mutual understanding. Only clear and honest communication on both sides can correct misconceptions and avoid disappointment, as Ukraine may move (too) slowly on its path towards EU membership. For EU policymakers, this means providing a realistic roadmap for Ukraine’s deeper integration into the EU without making promises that cannot be kept or raising false hopes. For Ukrainian policymakers, on the other hand, this means honestly reflecting on the challenges and costs of EU accession as well as removing the obstacles to it, such as by working diligently to meet the benchmarks during the accession process so that EU citizens may come to view the additional costs they might bear for Ukraine’s membership as a worthwhile investment.

Fostering such mutual understanding would help lay solid foundations for an EU enlargement that would strengthen both the Union and Ukraine. For this to succeed, responsible policymaking on the part of the EU and its member states should be based on three priorities:

1. Clearly identify the links between the accession process and European security and defence: Europe’s security environment is likely to remain uncertain for the foreseeable future. Even in the event of a ceasefire, Russia will not stand by idly, as one of its war aims is to weaken the EU. Reduced US engagement with Europe will force European states to progressively assume greater responsibility for their own defence. Ukraine can only be a reliable component of a more robust European security architecture if it is democratic, resilient and firmly anchored in the EU.

2. Address the differing expectations of Ukrainians and EU residents about how to balance rapid accession (speed) with a rigorous accession process (soundness): Strategic, targeted communication should help ease the tension between these goals and clarify Ukraine’s contribution to European security, fostering mutual understanding and maintaining long-term support for Ukraine’s deeper integration. Interim arrangements, such as political membership* and deeper sectoral integration into the EU single market, can be sensible steps towards closer alignment and enable both sides to better understand each other’s perspectives. Such interim arrangements are a prerequisite for making tangible progress together rather than remaining stuck in a protracted accession process that carries the risk of maintaining a grey zone – which is not a sound basis for strengthening a free, reform-oriented and pluralistic Ukraine.

3. Prepare for the long “marathon” of managing public expectations during Ukraine’s accession process: Convey information about the significant hurdles that need to be overcome to bring about systemic change in a country in transition while also countering misinformation by reaching out to those audiences most likely to be targeted by and believe it. In Ukraine, there are no simple solutions to the struggles over power at the heart of state reform processes. Building a system based on independent institutions rather than personal loyalties is challenging and deserves long-term support. Such support may be made conditional, but individual corruption scandals should not in themselves lead EU policymakers and residents to question its underlying rationale, provided that independent state institutions investigate them and there is evidence that institutional checks and balances are taking effect. Lastly, to secure and sustain support among EU citizens, policymakers should help them understand the role that Ukraine’s open society is playing in reforming the Ukrainian state.

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* For details on how to make Ukraine’s affiliation with the Union politically binding without compromising the institutional and legal requirements of full EU membership, see Political EU Membership as a Bridge Out of the Geostrategic Grey Zone, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026.

About eupinions

eupinions is an independent platform dedicated to gathering and analysing data on European public opinion. We provide insights into what Europeans think about current political issues and emerging megatrends. 

Every quarter, we conduct surveys across all EU member states in 22 languages. Our data is representative of the population in terms of age, gender and country/region. 

eupinions is a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. The data are collected by Nira Data.

For more information, visit http://eupinions.eu!

Methodology note

The samples analysed in this report were drawn by Nira Data (formerly Latana and Dalia Research) across all 27 EU member states and Ukraine (the government-controlled parts) in June 2026 (EU: n=16,795, Ukraine: n=2,153). The EU samples reflect current population distributions with respect to age (18-69 years), gender, education and place of residence (city, town or suburb, or rural area). To obtain census-representative results, the EU data were weighted using the most recent Eurostat statistics. The Ukrainian data are weighted on age and gender using the United Nations’ World Population Prospects.

Any references to cross-country differences in this report are limited to 10 EU countries with sufficiently large sample sizes – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden – as well as Ukraine.

The estimated overall design effect of the final European weights is 2.03. Accounting for this, the effective margin of error for EU-wide estimates is ±1.0% at a 95% confidence level.