Since Donald Trump was re-elected president of the United States in November 2024, he has imposed sweeping tariffs on the EU, questioned U.S. commitments to Ukraine and NATO, threatened to annex Greenland and initiated a war with Iran. These developments have left deep scars on the transatlantic relationship.

While the European Union and the United States have cooperated closely for decades, a growing majority of Europeans now believe the EU should chart an independent course. Nearly three in four European citizens (73%) say the EU should ‘go its own way’, up from 63% in 2024. Support for greater independence is highest in Portugal (84%) and lowest in Poland (63%). At the same time, Poland records the sharpest increase since 2024, rising by 23 percentage points.

The view that it is time for Europe to go its own way is broadly shared across society. Support remains high regardless of gender, education level or whether respondents live in urban or rural areas. The modest generational divide visible in earlier waves has largely disappeared. Indeed, the strongest gains are found among older Europeans: among those aged 56 to 69, support rose from 60% in 2024 to 75% in 2026.

The clearest divide is political. Support for a more independent Europe is strongest on the left and center-left, at 85% and 80% respectively in 2026, and remains solid among the center-right at 69%. On the right, it falls to 55%. In Germany, more than 80% of supporters of every political party represented in parliament favor greater EU independence – with the exception of supporters of Alternative for Germany (58%). Thus, support for greater EU independence commands majority backing across parties and countries in almost all cases. Poland stands out as the main exception: among supporters of Law and Justice (PiS), only 39% agree that the EU should go its own way. 

This desire for greater independence is closely linked to how Europeans are reassessing their relationship with the United States two years into the second Trump administration. The findings point to a relationship under growing strain.

A majority of Europeans (58%) do not see the U.S. as a trustworthy partner, up slightly from 54% in 2025. Distrust is highest in Germany, where 73% hold this view. Poland stands out as the only country in which a majority (61%) still considers the United States trustworthy. 

Across all demographic and social groups, the United States is viewed as largely untrustworthy. Regarding respondents’ political leaning from left to right across the EU, no majority considers the U.S. trustworthy. In Germany, trust is lowest among supporters of Die Linke (23%) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (21%), and highest among supporters of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) (39%).

Between 2024 and 2026, the share of respondents identifying the United States as the EU’s most valuable ally falls sharply by 20 percentage points, from 51% to 31% – a decline we refer to as the ‘Trump effect’. The steepest drops are recorded in the Netherlands (from 50% to 25%), Germany (from 54% to 31%), and Poland (from 65% to 42%). In no European country does an absolute majority of respondents view the U.S. as the EU’s most valuable partner. Even so, the United States remains the top choice for a plurality of respondents across Europe.

At the same time, Europeans remain open to working with the United States where interests align. A clear majority (57%) supports cooperation with the United States on China, although this too marks a decline from 64% half a year earlier.

Taken together, these findings point to a relationship under significant strain. While many politicians remain hesitant, European citizens are increasingly in favor of greater independence from the United States and express declining trust. Yet many still see the U.S. as a valuable partner for the EU and support cooperation on shared strategic challenges such as China.

Even though trust in the U.S. is low, China is not emerging as an alternative pole of attraction. A stable share of 9% of Europeans see China as the EU’s most important ally. Spain is the only country where China ranks among the top three allies, at 12%. 

Furthermore, 61% of Europeans view China’s global influence negatively. Respondents in Germany (74%), France (69%) and the United Kingdom (67%) hold the most negative views of China’s role, while those in Spain (49%), Portugal (48%) and Italy (47%) are comparatively more positive.

From a generational perspective, younger Europeans (18–35) tend to view China’s role more positively (45%) than their older peers (aged 56–69, 34%). Finally, respondents on the political right and center-right are more skeptical of China (67%) than those on the left (43%). 

In a period of geoeconomic confrontation, Europeans acknowledge their dependence on China. Some 67% describe their country’s economic relationship with China as one of dependence – rising to a striking 80% in Germany. 

Among those who consider their country dependent, 77% support reducing that dependence even if it harms their economy in the short term. This share is even higher in countries such as Germany (80%), France (84%) and Portugal (85%). Respondents on the political left are more willing to reduce dependence on China (82%) than those on the right (68%). In Germany, around 90% of almost all political parties favor reducing dependence on China – with the exception of supporters of Alternative for Germany (59%). 

Overall, Europeans take a largely negative view of China’s role in the world and appear willing to bear economic costs to reduce their dependence. China has not benefited from declining trust in the United States; instead, other partners are gaining in importance.

As support for the United States as the EU’s most valuable ally has declined, it has largely been redistributed within the broader transatlantic camp. The United Kingdom’s standing has risen from 13% in 2024 to 24% in 2026, while Canada’s has increased from 7% to 13% over the same period. In Belgium (28%), France (27%) and the Netherlands (28%), slight pluralities now name the UK rather than the U.S. as the EU’s most valuable ally.

At the same time, support for greater European independence does not amount to a rejection of NATO. A majority of Europeans – 63% in 2026, virtually unchanged from 64% in 2024 – believe that NATO membership provides protection against threats to peace. Support is highest in Poland at 78%, followed by the United Kingdom and Portugal (both 67%) and lowest in France (52%) and Italy (57%). 

Support remains strong across most demographic and social groups, though somewhat lower among younger Europeans (59% among those aged 18-35, compared with 68% among those aged 56-69) and among respondents on the political right (48%). 

In Germany, support is particularly low on the political right, with only 37% of supporters of Alternative for Germany viewing NATO as protective, compared with much stronger backing among supporters of the CDU/CSU (87%), SPD (77%) and Alliance 90/The Greens (83%).

This continued attachment to NATO is also reflected in attitudes towards defense spending. Across the EU, 57% consider the 5% NATO spending target to be reasonable. There is majority support in almost all countries surveyed, with the highest support in Poland (81%). Italy is the main exception, where support is lowest at 44%.

Taken together, these findings suggest that Europeans do not view greater independence as a clean break with existing partnerships. Rather, they point to a continued preference for cooperation – even as Europe seeks to define a more independent role on the global stage.

Europeans want the EU to take on a stronger global role. Over the past ten years, more than 70% have consistently said they would like the EU to play a more active part in world affairs. This trend continues in 2026, with 71% holding this view. Support is especially high in Portugal (85%) and Spain (79%), while respondents in Germany (66%) and France (63%) are somewhat less enthusiastic. 

The main divide here is political. While respondents on the left (81%) and center-left (80%) favor a more active EU, those on the right (49%) and center-right (68%) are more skeptical. 

Even though recent months have been marked by geopolitical tension and war, Europeans continue to believe that international affairs are driven by cooperation. Across Europe, 78% of respondents say international relations thrive on cooperation rather than competition. This view is particularly widespread in Germany (86%), the Netherlands (85%) and Poland (83%), while less pronounced in Portugal (68%), Italy (68%) and France (70%). 

Furthermore, older Europeans (aged 56–69) are more likely to believe in international cooperation (85%) than younger Europeans (aged 18–35, 71%). 

Europeans want their Union to become more independent and to step up on the global stage. Yet, in a world characterized by conflict and confrontation, they continue to place their faith in cooperation. 

All in all, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s data point to an uncomfortable truth: two years into the second Trump presidency, the transatlantic relationship has suffered significant damage. The U.S remains Europe’s most important ally, but its standing has declined sharply over the past 18 months. At the same time, China does not represent a viable alternative. Where many politicians remain cautious, public opinion is more clear-cut: Europeans want the EU to become more independent of the U.S. They want to reduce dependence on China – even at a cost. And they want the EU to step up its role in world affairs.