Please note

This is Part II of “Old Habits Die Hard.”

In Part I of Old Habits Die Hard, we present evidence for overall EU and US public opinion as well as a breakdown of the results by location, by age, by education and by political leaning.

Part II is a deep dive into the European data set. Here, we present evidence for overall EU public opinion, its breakdown by seven member states (Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and Spain), as well as by location, age, education and political leaning.

Introduction

Today, in every US election, two world visions are on the ballot: One focuses on a redefined American engagement in the world alongside partners, and another that is largely isolationist and puts narrowly understood national interest at its core. Against this backdrop, the re-election of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States provided clarity about what to expect from the world’s most powerful nation and how to adopt.

In view of this decision by the American voters, we examine how Europeans perceive the future of the transatlantic partnership, how they assess their role in the world, the threats they perceive and the allies they value.

For this, we draw on a September 2024 survey of over 26,000 EU citizens. The samples are representative for the EU as a whole, as well as for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and Spain.

In a nutshell, we see that eight years of American hyper-polarization at home and mixed messaging abroad have taken their toll. Today, 63% of Europeans agree that it is time for Europe to go its own way.

Following a breakdown of our key findings question by question, as well as all results as infographics, including subgroups:

Who’s the European Union’s most valuable ally?

51% of Europeans pick the United States as the EU’s most valuable ally. One’s location – city or rural – does not seem to have an important impact on this assessment. Age, however, does. Our data suggests that the younger are less likely to pick the US as most valuable ally: 38% of those aged 18–35 do, 52% of those aged 36–55 do and 63% of those over the age of 55 do. Europeans with a university degree are more likely to point to the US as the EU’s most valuable ally, and those who position themselves politically in the center are more likely than those at the edges. The UK holds the second place in the general sample as well as all in subgroups with about 13%. Similar patterns emerge in the member states.

54% see the US as the most valuable ally. There is a slight urban/rural divide (52%/55%). Older Germans select the US by 68%, middle-aged Germans by 56%, and younger Germans by 38%. The highly educated see the most value in the partnership with the US (59%, 56%, 48%). Those who identify as center-left pick the US by 67%, those who identify as center-right by 62%, those on the right by 43%, and those on the left by 31%.

43% see the US as the most valuable ally. There is hardly an urban/rural divide (42%/44%). Older Belgians select the US by 52%, middle-aged Belgians by 45%, and younger Belgians by 34%. The highly educated see the most value in the partnership with the US (51%, 37%, 39%). Those who identify as center-left pick the US by 44%, those who identify as center-right by 52%, those on the right by 57%, and those on the left by 27%.

48% see the US as the most valuable ally. There is no urban/rural divide. Older French people select the US by 62%, middle-aged French people by 51%, and younger French by 32%. The highly educated see the most value in the partnership with the US (54%, 51%, 24%). Those who identify as right pick the US by 57%, those who identify as center-right by 56%, those on the center-left by 47%, and those on the left by 36%.

47% see the US as the most valuable ally. There is a slight urban/rural divide (49%/45%). Older Italians select the US by 54%, middle-aged Italians by 47%, and younger Italians by 41%. The highly educated see the most value in the partnership with the US (52%, 50%, 38%). Those who identify as center-right pick the US by 55%, those who identify as right or center-left by 50% respectively, and those on the left by 37%.

50% see the US as the most valuable ally. There is a slight urban/rural divide (52%/48%). Older Dutch people select the US by 66%, middle-aged Dutch people by 52%, and younger Dutch by 34%. The higher educated tend to see more value in the partnership with the US (55%, 58%, 35%). Those who identify as center-right pick the US by 63%, those who identify as right by 56%, those on the center-left by 53%, and those on the left by 32%.

65% see the US as the most valuable ally. There is a notable urban/rural divide (67%/59%). Older Poles select the US by 76%, middle-aged Poles by 68%, and younger Poles by 52%. The highly educated see the most value in the partnership with the US (72%, 71%, 39%). Those who identify as right pick the US by 73%, those who identify as center-right or center-left by 72%, respectively, and those on the left by 47%.

55% see the US as the most valuable ally. There is a notable urban/rural divide (58%/50%). Older Spaniards select the US by 70%, middle-aged Spaniards by 57%, and younger Spaniards by 39%. The higher educated tend to see more value in the partnership with the US (57%, 59%, 49%). Those who identify as center-right pick the US by 68%, those who identify as right by 65%, those on the center-left by 60%, and those on the left by 41%.

What is the greatest threat to peace in the European Union today?

Failing to secure borders is the top concern in the European Union. 25% of Europeans name this as the greatest threat to peace today. Second in place for Europeans are terrorist attacks (21%). The picture is fairly similar in all subgroups, with the notable exception of those who identify as on the right. They are even more focused on border security (37%).

23% see terrorist attacks as the top threat to peace in the EU. A close second place is shared by border security, an attack by a foreign aggressor, or by organized crime (21%). The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are most focused on border security (31%), and those amongst the highly educated, who are less focused on border security (17%).

23% see border security and terrorist attacks as the top threat to peace in the EU, closely followed by cyber attacks (19%), by an attack by a foreign aggressor (18%), or being undermined by organized crime (17%). The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are most focused on border security (37%).

28% see border security as the top threat to peace in the EU. Terrorist attacks come in as a close second (25%), cyber attacks as a close third (23%). The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are most focused on border security (42%).

23% see cyber attacks as the top threat to peace in the EU. Terrorist attacks come in as a close second (22%). Border security and organized crime take the third place (19%) The picture is similar over all subgroups with a notable exception of those on the right who are most focused on border security (30%).

22% see an attack by a foreign aggressor as the top threat to peace in the EU. Border security and cyber attacks come in as a close second (20%). Terrorist attacks and organized crime take the third place (19%) The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are most focused on border security (30%).

29% see an attack by a foreign aggressor as the top threat to peace in the EU. Border security comes in as a close second (28%), whereas organized crime takes the third place (17%), followed by cyber attacks (15%) and terrorist attacks (11%). The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the center-right and on the right, who are most focused on border security (37%, 40%).

26% see border security as the top threat to peace in the EU. Terrorist attacks come in as a close second (24%). Cyber attacks come in third (22%), followed by attacks by a foreign aggressor (16%) and organized crime (12%). The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the center-right and on the right, who are most focused on border security (30%, 47%).

Do you think your country’s membership in NATO protects against that threat?

A large majority of Europeans see NATO as a cornerstone of their security. 64% believe that NATO protects against what they assess as the prime threat. Similar patterns emerge over all subgroups, with the exception of those identifying on the right. Interestingly, they are least likely to believe in the importance of NATO as a protection (48%).

68% of Germans believe that NATO protects against their prime threat. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are least likely to believe in the importance of NATO as a protection (36%).

59% of Belgians believe that NATO protects against their prime threat. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are least likely to believe in the importance of NATO (44%). Those who are over 55 are most likely to see NATO as a protection (67%).

53% of French people believe that NATO protects against their prime threat. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are least likely to believe in the importance of NATO as a protection (36%).

65% of Italians believe that NATO protects against their prime threat. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are least likely to believe in the importance of NATO as a protection (51%).

63% of Dutch people believe that NATO protects against their prime threat. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the right, who are least likely to believe in the importance of NATO as a protection (46%).

80% of Poles believe that NATO protects against their prime threat. The picture is similar over all subgroups, but there are some notable exceptions: Those younger (71%), those less educated (71%), and those on the right (72%) are less likely to believe in the importance of NATO as a protection.

66% of Spaniards believe that NATO protects against their prime threat. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a few notable exceptions: Those older are more likely to believe in the importance of NATO (75%), and those on the right are less likely to believe in NATO as a protection (56%).

Do international relations thrive on cooperation or on competition?

80% of Europeans believe that international relations thrive on cooperation, not on competition - with very little variation between member states. Those younger, those with low education, and those on the left are more likely to pick competition (29%, respectively) rather than cooperation as a thriver of international relations.

85% of Germans believe that international relations thrive on cooperation. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a notable exception of those on the left, who are least likely to believe that cooperation trumps competition (68%). Young people (74%) and those with low education (78%) are also more skeptical.

75% of Belgians believe that international relations thrive on cooperation. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a few exceptions: The young and those on the left are least likely to believe in that cooperation trumps competition (63%, respectively). Those with low education are also more skeptical (69%).

75% of French people believe that international relations thrive on cooperation. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with two notable exceptions: The young (65%) and those with low education (54%) are least likely to believe in cooperation.

78% of Italians believe that international relations thrive on cooperation. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with one notable exception: Those with low education are least likely to believe in cooperation (65%).

79% of Dutch people believe that international relations thrive on cooperation. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a few notable exceptions: The young (66%), those with low education (66%), and those who position themselves on the political left (69%) are least likely to believe in cooperation.

84% of Poles believe that international relations thrive on cooperation. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with a few notable exceptions: The young and those with low education are least likely to believe in cooperation (72%, 65%). The old and those with high education strongly believe in cooperation (93%, 90%).

79% of Spaniards believe that international relations thrive on cooperation. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with some notable exceptions: Again, the young (69%), those with low education (69%) and those on the right (70%) are least likely to believe in cooperation. The old (88%) and those with high education (85%) strongly believe in cooperation.

Imagine you could choose what the EU should focus on in the coming years. What would it be?

With 20%, Europeans pick “Secure peace” as the most important task for the EU in the years to come. “Manage migration” and “Protect citizens’ right” follow (15%, respectively). Third place (11%) is shared by “Stop climate change” and “Fight inequality.” The picture is similar over all subgroups. Notably, those on the right focus even more on “Manage migration” (25%).

25% see “Secure peace” as the top task the EU should focus on. “Protect citizens’ rights” comes in second (14%). A close third place is shared by “Stop climate change” and “Fight terrorism” (12%). The picture is similar over all subgroups. Notably, those over 55 (31%) and those on the center-left (32%) focus even more on “Secure peace.”

20% choose “Manage migration” as the top task the EU should focus on. “Secure peace” (14%),  and “Protect citizens’ rights” (13%) follow. The picture is similar over all subgroups. Notably, those on the right focus even more on “Manage migration” (35%).

21% choose “Manage migration” as the top task the EU should focus on. “Secure peace” follows (14%). “Protect citizens’ rights” and “Fight inequality” share third place (13%). The picture is similar over all subgroups. Notably, those on the right focus even more on “Manage migration” (38%).

16% choose “Secure peace”, “Protect citizens’ rights” or “Create growth”, respectively, as the top task for the EU. “Manage migration” and “Secure public health” follow (13%). The picture is similar over all subgroups. Notably, those on the right focus even more on “Manage migration” (24%).

26% choose “Manage migration” as the top task for the EU, followed by “Secure peace” (19%) and “Stop climate change” (11%). The picture is similar over all subgroups. Those on the right focus notably more on “Manage migration” (45%).

29% see “Secure peace” as the top task the EU should focus on. “Manage migration” comes in second (15%), “Stop climate change” third (11%). Those over 55 (44%) and those on the center-left (36%) focus notably more on “Secure peace.”

19% choose “Protect citizens’ rights” as the EU top task, closely followed by “Manage migration” (18%). “Secure peace” comes in third (14%). The picture is similar over all subgroups. Those on the right focus notably more on “Manage migration” (32%).

The European Union should play a more active role in world affairs.

A large majority of Europeans (73%) aspire for the EU to play a more active role in world affairs. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with one notable exception: The political leaning seems to influence their position towards international engagement. The further right leaning, the lower the support for a more active role in world affairs is: Only 50% for those on the right.

73% of Germans wish for the EU to play a more active role in world affairs. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with one notable exception: The political leaning seems to influence their position towards international engagement. The further right leaning, the lower the support for a more active role in world affairs is: Only 34% for those on the right.

64% of Belgians wish for the EU to play a more active role in world affairs. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with one notable exception: The political leaning seems to influence their position towards international engagement. The further right leaning, the lower the support for a more active role in world affairs is: Only 45% for those on the right.

64% of French people wish for the EU to play a more active role in world affairs. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with one notable exception: The political leaning seems to influence their position towards international engagement. The further right leaning, the lower the support for a more active role in world affairs is: Only 39% for those on the right.  

79% of Italians wish for the EU to play a more active role in world affairs. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with one notable exception: The political leaning seems to influence their position towards international engagement. The further right leaning, the lower the support for a more active role in world affairs is: Only 59% for those on the right.

66% of Dutch people wish for the EU to play a more active role in world affairs. The picture is similar over all subgroups with one notable exception: The political leaning seems to influence their position towards international engagement. The further right leaning, the lower the support for a more active role in world affairs is: Only 39% for those on the right.

73% of Poles wish for the EU to play a more active role in world affairs. The picture is similar over all subgroups with one notable exception: The political leaning seems to influence their position towards international engagement. The further right leaning, the lower the support for a more active role in world affairs is: Only 43% for those on the right.

83% of Spaniards wish for the EU to play a more active role in world affairs. The picture is similar over all subgroups, with one notable exception: The political leaning seems to influence their position towards international engagement. The further right leaning, the lower the support for a more active role in world affairs is: Only 64% for those on the right.

In the last half century, Europe and the United States have often cooperated closely. Do you think that it is time for the EU to go its own way?

Most Europeans (63%) believe that it is time for Europe to go its own way. Similar patterns emerge in all subgroups. Notably, those on the left are strongly in favor of the EU going its own way (74%), those on the right less so (55%).

63% of Germans believe that it is time for Europe to go its own way. Similar patterns emerge in all subgroups. Notably, those on the left are strongly in favor of the EU going its own way (76%), those on the right less so (57%).

64% of Belgians believe that it is time for Europe to go its own way. Similar patterns emerge in all subgroups. Notably, those on the left are strongly in favor of the EU going its own way (81%), those on the right less so (53%).

64% of French people believe that it is time for Europe to go its own way. Similar patterns emerge in all subgroups. Notably, those on the left are strongly in favor of the EU going its own way (72%), those on the right less so (56%).

65% of Italians believe that it is time for Europe to go its own way. Similar patterns emerge in all subgroups. Notably, those on the left are strongly in favor of the EU going its own way (74%), those on the right less so (57%).

54% of Dutch people believe that it is time for Europe to go its own way. Similar patterns emerge in all subgroups. Notably, those on the left are strongly in favor of the EU going its own way (72%), those on the right less so (46%). Those over 55 and those highly educated are equally hesitant (45%, respectively).

60% of Poles do not believe it is time for Europe to go its own way. Similar trends show in all subgroups. Notably, those under 35 (50%), those with low education (62%), and those on the left (57%) are more likely to support the notion that it is time for the EU to go its own way. Those on the right less so (28%). Those over 55 (69%), those highly educated (67%), and those on the right (72%) strongly oppose the notion.

65% of Spaniards believe that it is time for Europe to go its own way. Similar patterns emerge in all subgroups. Notably, those on the left are strongly in favor of the EU going its own way (77%), those on the right less so (52%).

Conclusion

The outcome of the 2024 presidential election will likely put the transatlantic partnership between the European Union and the United States under strain.

Our analysis of public opinion shows that Europeans have understood the consequences of these developments for their own continent. 63% of Europeans think it is time for Europe to go its own way, up from 25% by the end of 2017 (De Vries and Hoffmann 2018). That said, at the same time, both the Pan-European public and the national publics in Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain still view NATO as a cornerstone of their security, and favor cooperation over competition in international politics. 

When delving deeper into subgroups, three notable trends emerge:

  • Young people seem to be more hesitant to adhere to the fundamentals of the Western alliances: They are less likely to see the United States as the most valuable ally. They are less likely to believe that NATO protects against the prime threat to peace in Europe. Finally, they are more likely to see competition as the thriving force of international politics than cooperation.
  • The right wing seems to be more protectionist and antagonist. People who self-identify as right-wing care notably more about border protection and see migration as the most important task for the EU in the near future. They believe less in the importance of NATO and are least likely to wish for the EU to play a bigger role in world affairs.
  • Geography matters. Poles and Germans tend to see “Secure Peace” as the most important task for the EU in the recent future and worry more about an attack by a foreign adversary. Others pick “Manage migration” and Border Security instead. Also, Poles are least likely to believe that it is time for Europe to go its own way. In fact, a majority of Poles disagree with that statement.

So far, fragmentation rather than unity has been the name of the game when it comes to common foreign and security policy at the European level. The question will be if European leaders throughout member states and in Brussels find a way to meet this moment.

About eupinions

eupinions is an independent platform for European public opinion. We collect and analyse data on European public opinion and comment on what Europeans think about current political issues and megatrends.​

Every quarter, we collect samples from each EU member state in 22 languages. ​Our data is representative with regard to age, gender, education and country/region.​

eupinions is a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. The data is collected by Latana.​

Visit www.eupinions.eu for further information!

Methodology note

The samples analyzed in this report were drawn by Latana in September 2024 across all 27 EU member states (with a size of n=26,454). Our samples take into account current population distributions with regard to age (18-69 years), gender, education and country/region. In order to obtain census representative results, the data were weighted using the most recent Eurostat statistics.

Any references to differences between EU member states in the report pertain only to the seven EU countries with sufficiently large sample sizes: Belgium (n=1,967), France (n=2,824), Germany (n=2,935), Italy (n=2,766), The Netherlands (n=2,138), Poland (n=2,430), and Spain (n=2,534).

Given the sample size and design-effect considerations, the margin of error is 0.8% at a confidence level of 95%.