Polish residents, their political party preferences and attitudes towards key Ukraine policies
In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion into Ukraine, profoundly altering EU policies and politics. The European Union and its member states have strongly supported Ukraine in its defence.
In October 2023, Poland experienced a significant political shift as the right-wing coalition led by the PiS-party of Jaroslaw Kaczynski lost its majority after 15 years in power. The new prime minister, Donald Tusk, and his centre-left government, initiated a departure from confrontational politics, directing their efforts towards fostering stronger ties with the EU and its leaders. At the same time, they sought to strengthen relations with Ukraine which, given the country’s direct neighbour status and the fact that both Poland and Ukraine share a closely intertwined history with Russia, was deemed to be an urgent endeavour. Polish solidarity and support for Ukraine and its people has been notably robust.
Against the backdrop of the upcoming European parliamentary elections, this report focuses on the correlation in Poland between individuals’ political party preferences and their stance on seven key Ukraine-related policy issues:
1. Does the European Union need a common defence policy?
2. Should the EU support Ukraine by delivering weapons?
3. Should your country accept refugees from Ukraine?
4. Should the EU accept Ukraine as a member state in the coming years?
5. Should the EU become more energy independent of Russia even if that means prices are rising even further?
6. Do you think economic and financial sanctions on Russia are effective or ineffective?
7. Do you think the reconstruction of Ukraine will be an economic opportunity or an economic burden for the EU?
For each question, we provide an overview of the general distribution in Poland, followed by a breakdown according to political party preferences. These findings stem from a survey conducted in December 2023, encompassing nearly 13,000 EU citizens. Our dataset is representative of the EU as a whole and, more specifically, of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. In Poland, we interviewed 1,113 citizens.
Please note
This report “Poland, the War and the Vote” is part of an eight-part series.
Part 1
explores the relationship between political orientation and support for Ukraine-related policies across the EU and in seven member states.
Parts 2-8
Part 1 is complemented by seven country reports, each examining the correlation between political party preferences and the same set of Ukraine-related questions:
An overview:
1. Which political party – if any – do you feel close to?
General distribution (GD) in Poland
2. Does the European Union need a common defence policy?
GD in Poland and by political party preferences
3. Should the EU support Ukraine by delivering weapons?
GD in Poland and by political party preferences
4. Should your country accept refugees from Ukraine?
GD in Poland and by political party preferences
5. Should the EU accept Ukraine as a member state in the coming years?
GD in Poland and by political party preferences
6. Should the EU become more energy independent of Russia even if that means prices are rising even further?
GD in Poland and by political party preferences
7. Do you think economic and financial sanctions on Russia are effective or ineffective?
GD in Poland and by political party preferences
8. Do you think the reconstruction of Ukraine will be an economic opportunity or an economic burden for the EU?
GD in Poland and by political party preferences
Conclusions
As EU citizens prepare for the upcoming European Parliament elections in June, closely followed by the nomination of a new European Commission, our aim in this country report was to assess public sentiment and explore more deeply how Ukraine-related policies intersect with party preferences in Poland.
In summary, our findings are as follows:
- Support for Ukraine is very strong across political affiliations. Both the governing coalition and the opposition coalition demonstrate strong backing for Ukraine, with minimal differences between them.
- Support tends to be higher in the political centre than on either end of the political spectrum. Those who show no party affiliation or selected “other party” tend to exhibit lower levels of support compared to those who support either the governing or opposition coalition.
An analysis of each graph shows the following patterns:
- European Defence Policy: Support for the concept of a common European defence policy is robust across all subgroups. The strongest support for the idea is found among those backing the KO government coalition (94%). Support among those aligned with the opposition coalition is weaker but remains high at 80%. Those who selected “other party” or “no party” as their affiliation also express support (just over 80%). While there is vast support for the concept, individuals across different political affiliations may disagree on the specifics of what a common defence policy should entail.
- Weapons Delivery: Support for weapons delivery is strongest among those affiliate with parties in the opposition coalition (83%). Those aligned with parties in the government coalition follow close behind, with 78% support. Those who selected “other party” or “no party” affiliation are less likely to support this measure, with only 66% and 63%, respectively, expressing agreement.
- Refugee Acceptance: Support for accepting Ukrainian refugees is strongest among those aligned with parties in the KO government coalition (70%). Those affiliated with a party in the ZP opposition coalition (62%) demonstrate lower levels of support, while those who selected “other party” or “no party” show the lowest levels (54% and 53%, respectively).
- EU Membership for Ukraine: Overall, support for Ukraine’s EU membership has seen a downturn in recent months. When examining by party preference, support for Ukraine’s EU membership is nearly equal among those who align with the ZP (75%) and KO (72%). It is weakest among those with other party or no party affiliations (60%).
- Energy Independence: Support for energy independence from Russia is nearly equal among those aligned with the KO (80%) and ZP (76%). It is weakest among those with other or no party affiliation (65% and 61%, respectively).
- Effectiveness of Sanctions: A majority of Poles believe that economic and financial sanctions imposed on Russia are ineffective (62%). This belief is almost equally strong among supporters of ZP (60%) and KO (58%). Support is stronger among those with other party affiliations (62%) and strongest among those with no party affiliation (72%). Supporters of the governing coalition exhibit the most positive outlook, with 32% believing that the sanctions on Russia are effective.
- Reconstruction of Ukraine: A majority of Poles believe that the reconstruction of Ukraine will be an economic burden (55%). This sentiment is particularly strong among those with other or no party affiliations (65% and 56%, respectively). Supporters of the governing coalition are split evely (50%/50%), while supporters of the opposition ZP are most optimistic, with 53% believing that the reconstruction of Ukraine will be an economic opportunity rather than a burden.
About eupinions
eupinions is an independent platform for European public opinion. We collect and analyse data on European public opinion and comment on what Europeans think about current political issues and megatrends.
Every quarter, we collect samples from each EU member state in 22 languages. Our data is representative with regard to age, gender, education and country/region.
eupinions is a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. The data is collected by Latana.
Visit www.eupinions.eu for further information!
Methodology note
The samples analysed in this report were drawn by Latana in December 2023 (n=13,299) across all 27 EU member states. Our samples take into account current population distributions with regard to age (16-70 years), gender and region/country. In order to obtain census representative results, the data were weighted using the most recent Eurostat statistics.
Any references to differences between countries in the report pertain only to the seven countries with sufficiently large sample sizes: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.
Given the sample size and design-effect considerations, the margin of error is 0.9% at a confidence level of 95%.