Will support for Ukraine endure? How has it evolved over the past three months?

These are the questions many analysts are posing as the war in Ukraine continues. ​

The following graphs show how the intense debate on energy security, energy-saving measures, and efforts to support Ukraine in defending itself against Russian aggression have influenced views across Europe since March 2022. ​

We update this data on a quarterly basis, publishing the latest trends on EU opinions regarding Ukraine.​

The questions posed fall under three issue areas: ​

  1. The EU’s role in the world and its capacity to strengthen this role​

  2. The policies aiming to support Ukraine in its war effort: weapons delivery, acceptance of refugees, energy independence, EU-enlargement and common European defence policy​

  3. Personal concerns

  • This question has been part of our catalogue of trends tracked since 2015 (cf. eupinions.eu/trends).​

  • Overall, a large majority of Europeans have consistently supported the EU taking on a more active role in global affairs (79% in spring 2023).​

  • Support varies by country, ranging from 70% in France to 89% in Poland.​

  • Support consolidated amid the Russian attack on Ukraine, remaining high and stable throughout the last year.

  • Europeans consistently express the view that the EU must exercise both soft and hard power in order to play a role in global affairs. ​

  • Nearly 70% believe the EU needs military power.​

  • Nearly 90% believe that economic strength, strong allies and attractive values are essential.

Across the EU, support for the delivery of weapons to Ukraine dropped somewhat in fall 2022. By March 23, it bounced back to the level recorded in spring 2022. Poles express the greatest support, Italians the least.

  • Support for energy independence remains high (65% EU-wide and more than 60% in each member state).​

  • However, high energy prices have been taking their toll. ​

  • Within a year, support dropped by 9 percentage points across the EU.​

  • Support dropped by 14 percentage points in Poland, 12 in the Netherlands, 11 in France and 10 in Germany.

  • Support for accepting refugees remains nonetheless high at more than 70%.​

  • EU-wide, support has dropped by 7 percentage points within a year.​

  • In Germany, support has dropped by 13 percentage points, in Belgium by 11 and in Poland by 10.

EU-wide support for integrating Ukraine into the EU has fallen somewhat (4 percentage points) but remains stable at 65% since winter. Support is highest in Spain or Poland and lowest in Germany.

  • Close to 90% of Europeans believe the EU needs a common defence policy.​

  • Support for this remains exceptionally high and stable over time.​

  • Little variance on this between member states.​

  • Support in Spain and Poland is strongest (92%); lowest in France (83%).​

  • Rising cost of living tops the list of personal concerns.​

  • 42% of Europeans cite this as number one concern. It’s still up 2 percentage points since June 2022 but down by 7 since September 22 when it reached its apex (see next chart).​

  • Highest levels reported in Poland (52%), France, the Netherlands and Germany (45%).​

  • Though still the top-cited concern in Italy and Spain, the cost of living as a concern is lowest in these countries (29% and 37%, respectively). Poor health remains a major concern in both countries.

Following the data for cost of living, poor health and job insecurity in a time series.

In the EU as well as in most member states presented here, concern about increasing living costs soared in fall 2022, but has since declined. Poland and Spain are outliers, with concerns in Poland remaining particularly high, and concerns in Spain increasing by 2 percentage points since December 2022.

In Italy and Spain, the effects of the pandemic keep looming large. Italians and Spaniards worry more about poor health and job insecurity than their fellow Europeans. 


The eupinions figures presented here aim to shed light on the question as to whether European solidarity with Ukraine has been affected by the impact of the ongoing war, its risks and impacts. ​

In short, we see the following developments: ​

The data highlights stability with minor shifts in views, except for the issue of weapons delivery. Support for delivering weapons to Ukraine experienced a significant drop of approximately 10 percentage points in fall 2022, reaching close to the 50% mark. However, it has since rebounded to last year’s levels. Additionally, support for energy independence (- 9 percentage points since March 2022) and acceptance of Ukrainian refugees (- 7 percentage points) face challenges. ​

Nevertheless, there remains strong overall support for policies aiding Ukraine and Ukrainians. ​

Considering the gravity of the situation and associated costs, this stability is noteworthy.

About eupinions

eupinions is an independent platform for European public opinion. We collect and analyze data on European public opinion and comment on what Europeans think about current political issues and megatrends.​

  • Every quarter, we collect samples from each EU member state in 22 languages. ​

  • Our data is representative with regard to age, gender, education and country/region.​

  • eupinions is a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. The data is collected by Latana.​

  • Visit www.eupinions.eu for further information!

Methodology note

The samples analysed in this report were drawn by Latana in March (with a size of n=13,208), June (n=13,220), September (n=13,204) and December 2022 (n=13,300) as well as in March 2023 (n=13,270) across all 27 EU member states. Our samples take into account current population distributions with regard to age (16-70 years), gender and region/country. In order to obtain census representative results, the data were weighted using the most recent Eurostat statistics. ​

Any references to differences between countries in the report pertain only to the seven countries with sufficiently large sample sizes: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland and Spain. Calculated for a sample of this size and considering the design-effect, the margin of error would be 1% (March and September 2022) and 0.9% (June and December 2022, March 2023) at a confidence level of 95%.